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RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM IRAQ
The panel was convened at 10:45 a.m., Thursday, March 30, by its chair, Rosa Ehrenreich
Brooks of the University of Virginia School of Law, who introduced the panelists: Mark
Drumbl of the Washington & Lee University School of Law; Greg Kehoe, Advisor to the
Iraqi Special Tribunal; and Outi Korhonen of the Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles.*
THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL AND RULE OF LAW: CHALLENGES
By Mark A. Drumbl
My remarks address challenges faced by the Iraqi High Tribunal (or Iraqi High Criminal
Court, depending on the translation-I will stick with tribunal). I locate these challenges in
the tribunal's prosecution of Saddam Hussein. However, they spill over to other defendants
and to transitional justice/rule of law initiatives in Iraq at large. Some of these challenges
are general to all prosecutions of leaders and senior officials for atrocity; some are specific
to the situation in Iraq. All challenges remain fluid, insofar as the tribunal has just begun
its work.
The tribunal was established on December 10, 2003, and approved by the Iraqi Transitional
National Assembly on August 11, 2005. Its purpose is to prosecute high-level members of
the former Iraqi regime. The tribunal's statute, drafted in 2003, was amended in 2005 and
approved in October 2005.1 The tribunal is empowered to prosecute genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and certain violations of Iraqi law committed between July 17, 1968,
and May 1, 2003. It adheres to a civil law model with investigative judges. The tribunal is
to have primacy over all other Iraqi courts with respect to the extraordinary international
crimes within its jurisdiction. Its personnel are Iraqi. In its interpretation of the crimes within
its jurisdiction, the tribunal may resort to relevant decisions of international criminal courts.
2
The tribunal shall also turn for guidance to the sentences of international criminal courts
when it comes to affixing punishment for the extraordinary international crimes within its
jurisdiction.3 In addition to sentences previously issued by other international courts, the
tribunal is to take into account factors such as the gravity of the crime and the individual
circumstances of the convicted person. However, punishment is that prescribed by domestic
Iraqi law, which includes the death penalty. The tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence
permit guilty pleas. The rules mandate the trial chamber when sentencing offenders to take
into consideration aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Only one specific example is
given, this being a mitigating factor: substantial cooperation.
4
Why prosecute and punish perpetrators of mass atrocity? A review of the criminology and
penology of international criminal law suggests that prosecution and punishment satisfies a
number of aspirations, including: retribution, general deterrence, reconciliation, the expression
of the importance of law, and the authentication of a historical narrative. The October 2005
Mr. Kehoe and Professor Korhonen did not submit remarks.
Professor of Law and Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow; Director, Transnational Law Institute, School of Law,
Washington & Lee University.
1 Law No. 102005, Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court (Oct. 9, 2005), Official Gazette of the Republic of
Iraq, No. 4006 (Oct. 18, 2005).
2 1d., Art. 17.
3 1d., Art. 24.
4 On guilty pleas and mitigating/aggravating factors, see generally Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, No. 4006, Rules 37, 65 (Oct. 18, 2005).
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version of the Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal identifies its "justifying reasons" in a
postscript as follows:
" to expose the crimes committed in Iraq;
" to lay down rules and punishments to condemn the perpetrators after a fair trial;
" to form a high criminal court;
" to reveal the truth, agonies, and injustice;
" to protect the rights of Iraqis; and
" "alleviating injustice and for demonstrating heaven's justice as envisaged by the
Almighty God."
The "justifying reasons" therefore encompass all the goals generally placed upon the
shoulders of atrocity trials, although lean more toward truth-telling, capacity-building, and
expressivism than is the case with other institutions.
I would like to present and discuss four challenges faced by the tribunal in attaining these
ambitious goals. These are: (1) timing; (2) retrospective justice and prospective politics; (3)
trial narratives-namely, the stories that the trials are telling; and (4) faith in the potential
of rule of law.
TIMING: PROSECUTING DURING PERVASIVE INSECURITY
This concern is somewhat self-evident. The choice to prosecute Saddam Hussein and to
showcase his trial as an instrument for transitional justice was made at a time of ex ante
optimism about the ability to maintain security in Iraq. At present, however, Iraq is wrought
with insecurity. There are daily reports of bombings, death, and sectarian violence.
The tribunal itself has been plagued by violence. Since the proceedings opened on October
19, 2005, one judge has been killed, along with a court employee and two defense lawyers.
Other personnel have fled the country. Plots against the tribunal have been uncovered,
including to fire rockets at the courtroom itself.
The question, then, is one of sequencing: can trials can be effective, or functional, amid
such instability? I am doubtful. There must be some sort of security in order for a trial to
be effective. On the ground research, such as that undertaken by Nehal Bhuta and Cherif
Bassiouni, reveals that the depth of violence prevalent in the country renders Iraqis ambivalent
about the work of the tribunal. Moreover, interviews with Iraqis suggest frustration that there
is such a focus on historical crimes-and concomitant allocation of resources-while there
is impunity for gruesome crimes committed today.
It may well be deflating, but perhaps the time has come for a serious discussion of moving
trials out of Iraq. The initial choice to site the proceedings in Iraq and place them under
Iraqi control was laudable insofar as it pushed against the externalization of justice that has
plagued other international criminal justice institutions, such as the ICTR. However, there
are advantages to international proceedings. These include greater security for all trial partici-
pants and staffing by officials less vulnerable to national political pressures.
RETROSPECTIVE TRIALS AND PROSPECTIVE ALLOCATION OF POLITICAL POWER
The tribunal must be placed within the broader nexus of Iraqi politics. This is a politics
of sectarian claims, entitlements, and setbacks. The tribunal is a chit in the internal politics
of the prospective division of powers among the Kurd, Shiite, and Sunni groups. The work
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of other transitional justice institutions, such as the De-Ba'athification Commission, also
must be placed within the context of sectarian conflict emblematic of Iraqi politics.
One of the major dynamics of Iraqi politics is that Sunnis see their influence dissolving.
Sunni identity politics are not related to the resuscitation, rehabilitation, or restoration of the
Saddam regime. Accordingly, the success of the tribunal's work should not be evaluated
from the perspective whether it changes Sunni perceptions about the prior regime. Rather,
the tribunal's central challenge is to allay fears that the trials are a mechanism of ethnic and
religious differentiation and subordination. It is unclear whether fastidious adherence to
internationalized norms of due process will suffice to allay these fears. Many Sunnis see
only a tribunal presided by a Kurdish judge redressing the suffering of Shiite and Kurdish
victims.
Admittedly, transitional justice largely is intergenerational. The process must be assessed
longitudinally. German public opinion, initially negative toward Nuremberg, changed over
time. Eventually, the IMT at Nuremberg judgment and even Control Council Law proceedings
became a template for Germans to discuss and consider their involvement in atrocity. Might
this happen in Iraq? Possibly, but it simply is unrealistic to expect it to happen quickly.
In terms of outreach to the Iraqi population, another glaring gap is the invisibility of
women at the tribunal in any capacity other than as victims.
TRIAL NARRATIVES
In response to the shortcomings of the omnibus (and now terminated) Milogevi6 proceed-
ings, the tribunal's work has become operationalized through a series of up to a dozen mini-
trials, each keyed to a specific incident. The first mini-trial involves the killing of 148
individuals in the Shiite village of Dujail. These individuals had been sentenced to death by
the Revolutionary Court in 1984 following a failed assassination attempt on Saddam in Dujail
in 1982. Many individuals died under torture before they could be executed.
Dujail was selected as the first mini-trial owing to perceptions it provided a water-tight
case. Subsequent mini-trials involve a higher-stakes context. This is the case with proceedings
related to the Anfal campaign which resulted in the killing of 50,000 Kurdish civilians in
1988, including by chemical weapons. Indictments have been issued against seven defendants,
including Saddam, on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. At the time of
writing, it is anticipated that the Anfal campaign will constitute the second mini-trial. Other
potential upcoming mini-trials would be centered around fiery accusations, including draining
of the marshes and crushing of the 1991 Shiite uprising in the south by Sunni tribes of the
west (allegedly under Saddam's order, which led to 150,000 deaths).
The prosecution case with regard to the Dujail violence is nearly closed. Things have been
proceeding apace for the prosecutor. Documentary evidence was proffered and admitted by
the tribunal that implicates Saddam, as well as the Revolutionary Court, in sentencing and
ordering executions of Shiites not plausibly connected to any assassination attempt against
him. Prosecutors did an effective job displaying these signed documents in the courtroom
through audiovisual technology. These documents corroborate the often moving victim tes-
timony.
However, and not to minimize the suffering of victims, Dujail remains a relatively minor
thread in a broader tapestry of violence. The performativity of the Dujail proceedings is of
relatively modest value; other than the fact that-like the Altstoetter (jurists) trial by the
U.S. Military Commission at Nuremberg-Dujail permits the opportunity to judge the Revolu-
tionary Court as a whole for applying the law in the service of oppression.
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Although the Iraqi High Tribunal is moving toward the adduction of evidence regarding
the Anfal campaign, at the time of writing it remains unclear whether verdict and sentence
(as well as possible execution of sentence) regarding Dujail would be pronounced during
the Anfal (or further) proceedings. In a broader expressivist sense: if a low-stakes conviction
were to overshadow the remainder of the charges, then the tribunal would, in the name of
conservatism, have forsaken the opportunity to make a hardier historical footprint. The
subsequent proceedings, with greater narrative potential, might become anticlimactic owing
to deliberate sequencing decisions.
However, even if the legal technicalities are ironed out (as they likely will be), a paradox
remains. The iterated vignettes of atrocity planned by the Saddam trial may create a situation
where the sum of the vignettes may not add up to the normative force of an omnibus
conviction. There is a trade-off between risk management and narrative potential. The tribunal
will have to consider how to balance this trade-off and work hard to ensure that the sum of
the trial parts adds up to, and perhaps exceeds, the whole. Let us recall that the overarching
nature of patterns of criminality that the one joint trial by the IMT at Nuremberg revealed
about the Nazis yielded tremendously powerful narratives and authenticated the full force
of Nazi aggression.
On a related note: to what extent might the narrow truth and artificial reductionism of the
criminal trial (i.e., binary categories of guilt or innocence) shield much deeper inquiries?
Such inquiries might include international and foreign complicity in Saddam's abuses, such
as the selling of weapons (some of which has come to light in alternate proceedings, such
as the verdict in the Netherlands against Frans van Aaraat)5; the role of the United States
in providing financial support and material assistance to aid the Ba'athist war against Iran;
the complicity and involvement by ordinary Iraqis in totalitarianism; the U.S. exhortation
of uprising in 1991 and subsequent failure to support those who rose up; the toll UN sanctions
took on ordinary Iraqis and how these sanctions may have paradoxically strengthened Sad-
dam's control by weakening his opposition; and the legality of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
I do not raise these as tu quoque ("you too") defenses. Nor do these actually bear on
determinations of the individual guilt of defendants before the tribunal. Admittedly, defendants
may well exploit these issues to embarrass the tribunal. Nonetheless, these are historical
realities that may be squeezed out by application of the modern rules of evidence and,
therefore, fail to appear on the pages and transcripts of judicialized truths, notwithstanding
the fact that they form an important part of Iraqis' perceptions of their current reality and
of the very legitimacy of the tribunal in the first place.
Is there a relationship between the tribunal's control over the trial process and the legitimacy
of the narratives produced by this process? The current chief judge, Judge Rahman, has been
praised for his tight control over the courtroom, in contradistinction to Judge Rizgar, his
predecessor, who was subject to considerable criticism from politicians for having accorded
Hussein too much leeway (some say he in fact had lost control over the courtroom). On the
one hand, tight control is necessary for managerial and bureaucratic reasons, to streamline
5 In December 2005 the Hague District Court found Frans van Anraat guilty of complicity in war crimes in Iraq
and sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. Van Anraat is a Dutch businessman who supplied raw materials to
the government of Iraq that were used for the development of mustard gas and chemical weapons which were later
used to attack the Kurdish population of Halabja in 1988 (part of the Anfal campaign)-attacks the Dutch court
deemed to rise to the level of genocide (Van Anraat was acquitted of genocide insofar as the court did not find
sufficient evidence of his knowledge of the genocidal intent of the Iraqi government). It is unclear whether the
Iraqi High Tribunal would be influenced by the legal findings of the Dutch court on the question of genocide.
There is some indication, however, that the tribunal would access the evidence made available to the Dutch court
and the testimony. Sameer N. Yacoub, Saddam Charged With Gassing Kurds in '80s, WASH. PosT (Apr. 4, 2006).
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process, dissipate inflammatory controversy, and preserve the authority of the tribunal. The
need for such control arises from defendants' antics, designed to turn the proceedings into
farce. These include outbursts, taking prayer breaks during witness testimony, hunger strike,
a brawl, dismissal of defense attorneys, and Saddam's chief of intelligence (and half-brother)
appearing in pajamas.
However, there is a cost to managerial effectiveness in terms of the resonance of the trial
to wider audiences in Iraq and whether the full story of how Saddam consolidated power
and the multi-causal origins of this power is told. In particular, by thus far refusing to respond
to defense motions that pertain to the tribunal's jurisdiction and the legality of its creation,
the tribunal may weaken its own credibility. Whereas debate over the formation of the
tribunal may be unnecessary, embarrassing, or technical to U.S. officials, this debate may
be constructed differently by Iraqis insofar as it goes to the heart of the U.S. occupation and
continuing U.S. control over important political decisions in Iraq, 6 including the decision to
put Saddam on trial and invest large sums of money to that end. This presents a contrast
with the ICTY, whose decision in the Tadi6 matter-flaws notwithstanding-grappled with
important issues of legitimacy. I'm not sure what convincing rationalization the tribunal can
proffer regarding the legitimacy of its own creation, but engaging with the issue is preferable
to leaving it as the elephant on the table.
Too MUCH FAITH?
The tribunal was constituted amid a sense of giddiness. However, criminal trials of massive
human rights abusers can only do so much to restore rule of law, and restoring rule of law
can only do so much to promote a sense of justice, and justice can only do so much to
promote peace. There is a need for modesty with regard to pronouncements of the value of
the prosecution of a handful of people for systematic criminality and of the transformative
potential of such prosecutions. Overly ambitious and unrealistic expectations of the benefits
the prosecution would bring may now be returning to deflate the tribunal, leaving trial
audiences with a sense of relative disappointment.
In conclusion, there also is need for some modesty, or at least circumspection, with regard
to broader simplifications of the transformative potential of rule of law generally. The United
States places considerable hope in democratization-not just in Iraq, but also generally,
given the extent to which goals of democratization are laced throughout the 2006 U.S.
National Security Strategy. Yet democratization is not a panacea. In fact, in the short-term
it may create gut-wrenching instability and polarization in multi-ethnic states, such as Iraq.
6 See, e.g., Edward Wong, Shiites Say U.S. Is Pressuring Iraqi Leader to Step Aside, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 28, 2006)
(noting that "[slenior Shiite politicians said [.. .1 that the American ambassador [Zalmay Khalilzad] has told Shiite
leaders to inform the Iraqi prime minister than the Bush administration does not want him to remain the leader of
Iraq in the next government.").
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